



RESETTLEMENT AT RISK: Meeting Emerging Challenges to Refugee Resettlement in Local Communities

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Prepared for the J.M. Kaplan Fund, February 2013



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Acknowledgements


This paper benefited greatly from the contributions of several colleagues.

The following individuals provided essential insight, ideas and guidance for the overall effort: Larry Yungk, Senior Resettlement Officer for the UNHCR Regional Office for the U.S. and the Caribbean; Jen Smyers, Associate Director of Immigration and Refugee Policy at Church World Service; and Naomi Steinberg, Director of Refugee Council USA.

On the specific issue of refugee backlash, I would like to thank Amy Marchildon, Director of Services for New Americans at Lutheran Social Services of New England; Stephen Fotopoulos, Executive Director of the Tennessee Refugee and Immigrant Rights Coalition; Paul Stein, State Refugee Coordinator of Colorado; and Barbara Seebart, State Refugee Coordinator of New Hampshire, for their time and perspective. Jill Garvey, Executive Director, and Aaron Flanagan, Director of Research at the Center for New Community, provided context for the backlash.

Lara Laufer, Senior Analyst, and Kathryn Larin, Assistant Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), answered questions and provided information about what they found in communities across the country while researching the GAO report.

Aaron Gershowitz, HIAS' Senior Director of Refugee & Immigrant Services, contributed his extensive resettlement expertise, and Shaina Ward, Policy Associate, provided invaluable research support.

 Finally, Suzette Brooks Masters of the J.M. Kaplan Fund commissioned this analysis of the growing challenges facing refugee resettlement in the U.S. and provided guidance and support throughout the process of researching and writing this paper.

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Introduction

Since 1975, over 3 million refugees have been resettled in the United States. They have started new lives in communities throughout the country. The U.S. State Department notes that “the United States is proud of its history of welcoming immigrants and refugees” and that “the U.S. refugee resettlement program reflects the United States’ highest values and aspirations to compassion, generosity and leadership.”¹

The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program has enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress as well as local support, particularly by faith communities, in the cities and towns across the U.S. where refugees have been resettled. At the same time, tensions between newly arrived refugees and local communities have always existed. Learning a new language and culture and becoming fully integrated take time and can create friction between the new arrivals and established residents in the community.²

In the past few years, coinciding with the rise in state and local efforts to pass restrictive anti-immigration laws, there has been a notable rise in state and local anti-refugee sentiment and activity across the country. A number of communities are expressing concern about the local impact of resettlement, and there have been statewide legislative and executive efforts to restrict and deter refugee resettlement.

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This paper will provide an overview of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and some of the new ways refugee resettlement has affected communities. It will also explore the recent rise in anti-refugee sentiment and activity in three states.

The paper includes recommendations for mitigating anti-refugee sentiment, fighting anti-resettlement efforts when they emerge, and strengthening the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. The goal of these recommendations is to ensure that the U.S. continues to lead the world in providing a safe haven to refugees, to integrate newcomers successfully, and to create and maintain thriving, diverse communities that are a model for the rest of the world.

The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: How It Works

A refugee is someone who has fled his or her home country and cannot return because he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution based on religion, race, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.³ According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN's global refugee agency, there are approximately 15.3 million refugees in the world today.⁴

Most refugees will remain in the country to which they fled, in the hope that eventually they will be able to safely return to their home country. Some refugees will be allowed to integrate and attain legal status in the country to which they fled. Less than 1 percent of all refugees are resettled in third countries. The U.S. resettles over half of these refugees, more than all other resettlement countries combined (see Appendix A), and ranks fifth in the ratio of resettled refugees to the general population (see Appendix B). After one year in the U.S., refugees are expected to apply for permanent residence (a green card) and, after five years as a permanent resident, a refugee is eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship.

The president decides how many refugees the U.S. will resettle each year. In fiscal year 2012, President Obama recommended that the U.S. resettle 76,000 refugees. Ultimately, 58,238 refugees were resettled. President Obama has recommended that 70,000 be resettled in fiscal year 2013, and the government is hopeful that be-

cause of processing improvements that number will actually be reached.⁵ Historically, refugee admissions have been as high as 207,000 in 1980 and as low as 27,000 in 2002 (when admissions plummeted after the September 11 attacks, see Appendices C and D). The normal range for refugee admissions has been between 60,000 to 90,000 per year.⁶

Three federal government agencies administer the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) of the U.S. Department of State is responsible for identifying refugees for resettlement (with the help of UNHCR), managing U.S. resettlement overseas, and providing support for refugees for up to 90 days after their arrival in the U.S.⁷ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for screening all refugees to determine if they qualify for admission to the U.S. and do not present a security risk. The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for providing resettled refugees longer-term cash and medical assistance, as well as language and social services focused on early employment and self-sufficiency.⁸

Five international and nongovernmental organizations operate eight Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) around the world under the supervision and funding of PRM. The RSCs gather documents, con-



Marc (Mamoun) Dulaimy, a recently naturalized refugee from Iraq

duct interviews, and prepare refugee files so PRM can consider and process the cases for resettlement.⁹ The RSCs also provide cultural orientation courses for refugees before they travel to the U.S. that last from one to five days. The courses are intended to help prepare refugees to adjust to their new lives in the United States.

Nine domestic nongovernmental organizations with some 350 affiliated offices across the country are responsible for resettling the refugees in communities throughout the U.S. These organizations, also known as “Voluntary Agencies” or “volags,” have “cooperative agreements” with PRM that specify the services the agencies must provide, including oversight of the agency’s local affiliates. The affiliates provide services such as meeting the refugees at the airport, preparing their housing arrangements, helping refugees find English classes, medical care, social and language services, and employment, and registering children for school.¹⁰

The volags determine which refugees they will resettle and which agencies and communities will receive them. Refugees with relatives in the United States are likely to be resettled with or near them. Refugees who have no family in the U.S. are “sponsored” by the resettlement agency, which decides on the best match between a community’s resources and the refugee’s needs.¹¹ Factors considered during the placement process include the refugee’s health, age, and family makeup. The national volags receive only basic information about the refugees before they select the cases they will resettle, so refugees are often placed in communities without their specific needs and the availability of specialized resources having been fully considered. After the volag has been assigned a refugee, PRM provides the agency with basic biographical information and some medical information.

PRM provides the affiliate with \$1,875 per refugee to defray a refugee’s costs during the first few months after arrival. Most of these funds go toward the refugee’s rent, furniture, food, and clothing; up to \$750 can be used to defray the costs of agency staff salaries, office space and other resettlement-related expenses that are not donated or provided by volunteers.¹²

At its inception, the U.S. refugee resettlement program provided up to three years of support to refugees to promote integration. Since the mid-1990s, however, eligibility periods for support have been reduced and early self-sufficiency has become the chief priority of the program. The State Department notes that “the U.S. refugee resettlement program has found that people learn English and begin to function comfortably much faster if they start work soon after arrival,”¹³ and the Refugee Act of 1980 includes an emphasis on early employment.¹⁴

Refugees Resettled Today: Who They Are and Where They Come From

Since the post-World War II years, when the U.S. began accepting large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, both humanitarian and political goals have driven U.S. refugee and asylum policy. Refugee legislation was first enacted in 1948 after more than 250,000 displaced Europeans were admitted into the country; the new legislation allowed for the admission of an additional 400,000.¹⁵ During the Cold War, the U.S. admitted refugees fleeing Europe, the Soviet Union, East Asia, and Cuba for humanitarian reasons and also in an attempt to weaken communist regimes.¹⁶

These waves of refugees were largely assisted by religious and ethnic organizations that became the foundation of the public-private partnership in resettlement that exists today. After Vietnam fell in 1975, the U.S. resettled thousands of refugees from South East Asia, and soon enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which provided the legal framework for the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.¹⁷

In the mid-1990s, Congressional leaders began to express concern that the refugee program was no longer humanitarian but instead was used to serve political purposes.¹⁸ Processing priorities established in the early years of the program were in the context of large refugee outflows from South East Asia and were becoming less relevant. At the same time, refugee-producing conflicts were taking place in Africa and other parts of the world where the U.S. did not have the same high degree of political and military involvement as it had in South East Asia.

In 1995, the U.S. government explicitly shifted its resettlement focus away from populations of political concern to those with the most critical humanitarian needs, and began to rely on UNHCR to a greater extent to identify and refer refugees to the U.S. program. This shift allowed the U.S. to identify refugees from a wider range of conflicts resulting in the resettlement of more diverse refugees from a larger number of countries.¹⁹

Many refugees resettled in the U.S. today have spent years in refugee camps, have experienced trauma, are disabled, have limited work skills, and are not literate in their native languages. The long-term effect of these issues often appear long after the initial resettlement process, when the individual is no longer focused on survival and adjustment and can begin to process past traumatic events and start to move beyond them. These refugees require a broad range of services such as medical and psychological care and intensive English language training in order to even begin to be able to transition to self-sufficiency.²⁰

At the other end of the spectrum, some refugee groups, such as Iraqis, include a high percentage of highly educated individuals with professional experience, requiring recertification programs to help them enter the workforce as professionals.²¹ In addition, while more than 60 percent of refugees resettled in the past few years have been working age, around four percent were older than 65 and 35 percent were children (see Appendix E). The specialized services needed to meet varied needs of the elderly, mentally or physically ill, children, torture and trauma survivors, those with low literacy, and highly skilled refugees resettled in the U.S. today are costly.²²

UNHCR considers a number of factors in considering whether to refer a refugee for resettlement. UNHCR will refer refugees for resettlement to meet the legal and physical protection needs of the refugee (including when a refugee is at risk of being returned to his or her country of origin); when a refugee has survived torture or violence and is at risk of further trauma or where appropriate treatment is not available; to meet a refugee's medical needs, in particular when life-saving treatment is unavailable in the first country of refuge; to protect women and girls at risk; to reunite refugee family members; to protect children and adolescents at risk, where resettlement is in the best interest of the child; and when a refugee will not be able to return home or integrate locally in the foreseeable future, when resettlement can be used strategically, or when it can open possibilities for comprehensive solutions to a particular refugee crisis.²³

The U.S. has its own list of factors in determining whether to accept a refugee for resettlement. The U.S. prioritizes referrals from UNHCR, non-governmental agencies, and U.S. embassies abroad, but nearly all of the refugees that fall into this category are referred by UNHCR. The U.S. also prioritizes certain groups of concern to the U.S., which currently include ethnic minorities from Burma, Bhutanese in Nepal, Iranian religious minorities, and Iraqis associated with the U.S. government. Family reunification is a lower priority for resettlement, although resettled refugees are given two years from when they arrive to petition for immediate family members to join them in the U.S.²⁴

In fiscal year 2012 the U.S. admitted refugees of more than 69 nationalities who began their resettlement journeys in more than 92 countries to which they first fled. While the countries and nationalities refugees have come from have become more diverse, more than 70 percent of refugees admitted in 2012 came from just three countries—Bhutan, Burma, and Iraq (see Appendix F).

Rising Anti-Refugee Sentiment

Historically, communities in the U.S. have been open to receiving resettled refugees and have provided them with an overall positive reception. This has been in large part because refugee resettlement is an affirmative, humanitarian act on the part of the United States and refugees selected for resettlement enter the U.S. legally. In addition, the network of voluntary agencies and religious and ethnic groups that assist refugees has engaged private citizens in helping refugees, which has helped build support for resettlement.

Another important factor contributing to the welcome that refugees have received is that from the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act to the mid-1990s, when resettled refugees primarily fled communism and major conflicts involving U.S. interests, there was a common understanding about who the refugees were and why they needed resettlement. In recent years, as the refugees resettled in the U.S. have become much more diverse, the nature of the conflicts they have fled and the persecution they have experienced is less clear to receiving communities.

In the past few years, as states and localities have experienced high unemployment rates and serious budget shortfalls and anti-immigrant laws have been advanced across the country, some communities have begun to question the costs of resettlement and oppose the arrival of new refugees. Financially strapped states and localities have become resentful about using scarce resources to supplement federal funding to meet the medical, education, housing, and transportation needs of refugees.

Although Congress has increased the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)'s budget, most of the new funds have gone to serve vulnerable migrant groups that Congress has placed under the mandate of ORR in recent years, such as unaccompanied immigrant children and Special Immigrant Visa recipients. ORR's budget has not kept up with its expanding mandate, the increasingly complex needs of the populations it now serves, cost of living increases, or inflation.²⁵

Local resettlement agencies have also struggled financially. Because the agencies are funded on a per-capita basis, when refugee arrivals fall short of PRM estimates or fluctuate dramatically during the year (as they have in recent years), affiliates must slash spending or attempt to raise private contributions to cover administrative costs for running the program, which has been particularly difficult during the economic downturn. This also affects the ability of the agencies to advocate for resettlement in their communities, as community outreach activities become difficult to maintain when resources are limited.

At the same time that economic uncertainty has made state and local governments reluctant to fund activities not broadly agreed to be essential and local residents are worried about their own futures, refugees have become more visible. Over the past two decades, resettlement has been shifting away from traditional immigrant gateways, such as Los Angeles and New York, to smaller cities where the cost of living is lower. In many medium and small metropolitan areas, refugees dominate the overall foreign-born population and are easily identified as a new population putting demands on the resources of the community.

This is particularly the case when a relatively large number of refugees have been resettled in a relatively small community, there has been a sudden increase in the number of refugees arriving in a location, or the refugees being resettled are visibly culturally, racially, or religiously different from a relatively homogeneous community.²⁶ Tensions can be further exacerbated if there is an additional influx of refugees through "secondary migration" from other parts of the country. To local communities, there may be little distinction made between refugees placed in a community through the U.S. refugee program and those who arrive on their own, even though governmental authorities have little control over the refugees' movement once they are in the U.S.

The concern about newcomers and their impact on a community's established way of life is heightened by the fact that many refugees resettled today are Muslims. In a comprehensive study on the American Muslim community that explores and documents how Muslims are integrating into U.S. society in over 75 cities across the United States, researchers found that "one of the most important factors for many Americans in judging their Muslim neighbors... is the idea that Muslims will not be loyal to America when push comes to shove and value Islamic law over the law of America."²⁷

Another factor contributing to the rise in anti-refugee sentiment is the emboldening of anti-immigrant local officials looking to target refugee resettlement by a slew of anti-immigrant legislation introduced and enacted in states across the country.²⁸ In 2010, Arizona passed Senate Bill 1070, an immigration-enforcement bill designed to make life so difficult for undocumented immigrants that they ultimately decide to leave the state. The year after SB 1070 passed, more than 20 other states introduced bills like Arizona's; the laws passed in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina and Utah. Although the courts have partially or wholly blocked all of these measures, in 2012 (before the November elections), lawmakers in Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi, West Virginia and Tennessee introduced similar bills.²⁹ The states and localities that have taken what had been exclusively federal immigration policy into their own hands have paved the way for local and state politicians seeking to stop refugee resettlement.

Resistance to the federal government's involvement in decisions about who resides in a community has also likely contributed to rising anti-refugee sentiment. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), "Discontent over federal mandates in areas ranging from health care to gun control to national security is fueling a states' rights revival in legislatures across the country." According to NCSL, in 2009, "formal protests against federal encroachment on states' authority and prerogatives under the 10th Amendment—in the form of sovereignty resolutions or memorials—were considered by legislators in 37 states."³⁰

Anti-immigrant groups are beginning to include refugees on their agendas. In May 2011, the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), which has strongly backed anti-immigrant state laws, published a report titled *Refugee Resettlement: A System Badly in Need of Review*. The report raises alarms by claiming that the system is "costly," there has been a "loss of U.S. control," and the refugee program has "failed refugees both by diverting limited resources from overseas assistance and by the sheer neglect of those resettled in the U.S." CIS



Burmese refugees resettled by HIAS' affiliate in San Diego, CA

alleges that the program is “rife with fraud” and brings in refugee groups “that have stated openly they do not intend to assimilate into American culture.”³¹

In addition, although cases of refugees connected to terrorism have been rare and refugees are among the most highly scrutinized and vetted immigrants in the U.S., anti-immigrant groups have suggested that the program is a gateway for terrorists. The recruitment of young Somalis by terrorist cells³² and the arrest of two resettled Iraqi refugees in Kentucky on terrorism charges³³ have provided fuel for these allegations (although concern about the Iraqi cases ultimately led the Department of Homeland Security to close the gap in security checks that allowed for their admission). Online forums such as *Refugee Resettlement Watch* have emerged for individuals critical of the resettlement program to share their concerns. Many of the posts express disdain for the refugee resettlement program, particularly the resettlement of Muslim refugees, along with anti-Muslim views.³⁴

Economic uncertainty combined with the lack of sufficient federal resources, the visibility of refugees in some communities, general anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment, and the willingness of some politicians to target resettlement for political reasons have led to a perception in receiving communities that refugees are a drain on state and local resources, particularly schools, healthcare systems, social services, and state assistance programs.³⁵ As these costs are immediate and easier to measure than the economic and other benefits refugees and all immigrants bring to communities long term, refugees and immigrants are increasingly seen as a burden rather than a benefit to communities. This is despite evidence that shows that refugees can stimulate economic development by increasing the tax base, starting new businesses, revitalizing neighborhoods, filling labor shortages, attracting investment from overseas, renting apartments, patronizing local businesses, and bringing federal funds directed toward schools and other public programs to local communities.³⁶

Case Studies: Resistance to Resettlement

Refugees live in all types of communities across the country, from large cities such as Houston, Dallas, Phoenix, Columbus, and Philadelphia, to smaller cities and towns such as Clarkston, GA, Winooski, VT, Lewiston, ME, and Utica, NY.³⁷ Some of the approximately 200 refugee resettlement communities are in states where statewide anti-immigrant legislation has been introduced with broad support and in some cases ultimately enacted, others in states that are traditionally more immigrant friendly and have not seriously considered sweeping anti-immigrant legislation.

Tennessee, New Hampshire, and Georgia are the only states that have recently attempted to stop refugee resettlement at the legislative or executive level. Resistance to resettlement has emerged in other communities across the country as well, although those states have not pursued statewide measures to stop resettlement.

Tennessee

Tennessee enacted the Refugee Absorptive Capacity Act in May 2011. According to State Senator Jim Tracy, the bill’s sponsor, the law requires resettlement agencies to let local governments know when a large number of refugees are coming “because it puts a burden on the local community.” Of the 4,333 refugees resettled in Tennessee from 2009 to 2011, 1,128 (26%) were Iraqi, 1,118 (26%) were Burmese, 817 (19%) were Bhutanese, 540 (12%) were Somali, and the rest were from other countries (see Appendix G).

The law states that a local government can request a “moratorium” on new resettlement by documenting that the community lacks absorptive capacity and that further resettlement would result in an adverse impact on existing residents. “Absorptive capacity” refers to a community’s ability to meet the existing needs of its current residents, the availability of affordable or low-cost housing, and “the capacity of the local school district to meet the needs of the existing or anticipated refugee student population.” The first draft of the bill included a provision that would allow a local government to issue, rather than merely request, a moratorium.³⁸ To date, no community has requested a moratorium under the provisions of the law.

In the years leading up to the law, many immigrants, including refugees who had been resettled elsewhere, moved to Shelbyville to work at the Tyson Foods plant. Many people in Shelbyville and throughout Tennessee were resistant to the newcomers. News articles and web postings complaining particularly about Somali refugees, who are Muslim, were prevalent.³⁹ There were also incidents of vandalism and hate crimes against Muslim immigrants, including the desecration and burning of mosques.⁴⁰

Also leading up to the refugee law were a number of bills aimed broadly at immigrants. In 2010, the Tennessee legislature passed an “English-only” law that sent a clear message about the legislature’s approach to non-English speaking newcomers in Tennessee.⁴¹ The Legislature has considered (but not passed) an immigration enforcement measure similar to the Arizona law, a law to require that tests for state driver’s licenses be given only in English,⁴² and a bill banning “Sharia law” in Tennessee, equating the practice of Islam with terrorism.⁴³ Behind all of these bills was the Tennessee Eagle Forum, a group linked to anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and far-right extremist groups.⁴⁴

In February 2012, the acting assistant secretary of PRM met with Senator Tracy and others to discuss the law. Senator Tracy said that PRM wanted to explain how the refugee program worked and to clarify that PRM had no control over secondary migration. Senator Tracy brought up the local unemployment rate and refugees’ receipt of state benefits. “If you are going to bring refugees into a community, you need to meet with community leaders, mayor, councilmen, commissioners, school superintendents, hospitals, anyone that an influx of a refugee group would affect,” Senator Tracy said. “It was interesting that they (the State Department) would travel to Tennessee to talk about the legislation that we passed last year and I really take it as a compliment... I think they were already supposed to be doing that, and in Tennessee, they have to be doing that now.”⁴⁵

At the time the refugee bill was passed, the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (TIRRC) expressed concern that the bill would encourage local governments to pass symbolic resolutions to discourage further refugee resettlement. TIRRC said that new laws should encourage communication between refugee groups and resettlement agencies and the towns that receive them, “but not create a hostile environment for refugee families who have come to Tennessee to escape persecution, find honest work, and begin rebuilding their lives.”⁴⁶ TIRRC has also expressed concern that the Tennessee bill is an example for other states and an incremental step for those in Tennessee who may seek to enact more sweeping legislation in the coming year.

New Hampshire

In 2012, the New Hampshire legislature considered anti-refugee legislation similar to the original Tennessee bill.⁴⁷ Manchester Mayor Ted Gatsas, who was behind the legislation, said his city was “drowning in demands for services, being by far the largest refugee resettlement city in the state with 200 or more coming every year.” Mayor Gatsas faulted the federal government and local resettlement agency for failures in the program.⁴⁸

In the past 10 years, 2,100 mostly Somali, Sudanese, Bhutanese, and Iraqi refugees have been resettled in Manchester, a city of around 110,000. Manchester has a significant immigrant population as well, with more than 60 languages spoken in the city but only around a quarter of these spoken by resettled refugees. Of the

1,622 refugees resettled in New Hampshire from 2009 to 2011, 1,264 (78%) were Bhutanese, 186 (11%) were Iraqi, and the rest came from other countries (see Appendix H).

Mayor Gatsas first tried to stop resettlement in Manchester by requesting a moratorium from PRM for fiscal year 2011. The mayor and other supporters of the moratorium said they were concerned about the refugees' living conditions and lack of employment opportunities and about shrinking state and federal budgets.⁴⁹

Refugees already resettled in Manchester, while also expressing concerns about the job market and housing conditions, were upset by the proposal. Some said they had relatives in refugee camps and feared they would be blocked from coming to Manchester. One Bhutanese refugee who arrived in 2008 after spending 18 years in a refugee camp said that life in Manchester "is far better, 110 percent better, than life in a refugee camp." The local resettlement agency director said the agency would "do a better job with outreach to the community and dispelling myths and making sure people know the facts."⁵⁰

In response to the mayor's request, PRM decided to limit resettlement to 200 refugees in Manchester in 2011, rather than the 300 proposed by the local resettlement agency. At the time, a PRM official said "this was probably a more significant reduction than we would normally make." PRM also said that a moratorium would make no sense, because virtually all refugees scheduled to arrive in Manchester were reuniting with family members and would likely move to Manchester regardless of where they were resettled initially.⁵¹

The mayor, unsatisfied by this result, tried and failed to convince the state to withhold federal grants for resettlement programs in New Hampshire. He then turned to the state legislature, and in early 2012, Representative Laurie Pettengill, who has indicated that she does not believe immigration laws should be left to the federal government,⁵² introduced HB 1405 in the New Hampshire House of Representatives. A House committee voted against the bill, but the House disregarded that vote and passed it. The Senate voted against the bill and it has not been enacted.⁵³

A broad coalition of immigrant advocacy and refugee resettlement agencies, schools, and health and social service providers, with support from the national refugee resettlement agencies with affiliates in the state, came together quickly to fight the bill. House supporters of the bill aggressively pushed the legislation despite the opposition. The House majority leader, who supported the bill, said, "I thought it was important to send a message to (the federal government) that while we value refugees in New Hampshire, the core issue of HB 1405 is allowing communities to effectively and fairly assimilate refugees into the community without overwhelming the infrastructure of the community; for example, school systems and human services."⁵⁴ Advocates continue to work to mitigate anti-refugee sentiment and monitor anti-refugee action in the legislature.

Georgia

In late 2010, the office of Georgia Governor Nathan Deal withheld contracts for federal funding earmarked to provide English, job training, and afterschool and summer academic programs to refugees in Georgia. The governor's office said that the governor froze the contracts because he wanted to review the refugee resettlement program in the state. From 2009 to 2011, the number of refugee arrivals decreased from 3,272 to 2,635 per year. During that time a total of 9,131 refugees were resettled in Georgia. About a third of the total was from Bhutan, a third from Burma, and the rest from Iraq and other countries (see Appendix I).

Although the governor's office offered no reason for the review, it is believed that an elected official from Clarkston, a small city east of Atlanta, complained to the governor on behalf of a constituent. The official, who in 2003 had introduced legislation to require resettlement agencies to notify local government officials if 10 or more refugees would be resettled in a community at one time, told the governor's office that Clarkston was at "capacity."⁵⁵

Facing the prospect of staff layoffs and the disruption of critical services for refugees, the network of agencies providing services to refugees created an informal coalition to advocate for the release of the federal funds. The coalition worked to gather information and educate elected officials, influential supporters of the governor, as well as police chiefs and school officials, about the economic and other benefits of refugee resettlement in Georgia. National refugee resettlement agencies with affiliates in Georgia provided guidance and some on-the-ground support. U.S. Representative Hank Johnson, along with the Clarkston mayor, wrote a letter of support for refugee resettlement in Georgia.

In December 2011, Governor Deal released the funds. In a thank you letter to the governor, the state resettlement agencies noted that 85% of refugees resettled in Georgia are self-sufficient within 180 days, largely because of this funding for services. The group also thanked ORR for its support in resolving the contract delays and elected officials, faith leaders, business owners and community members in Atlanta for their support and advocacy and for their commitment to the humanitarian cause of resettlement.⁵⁶

PRM later met with Georgia officials and, in response to the state's concerns, encouraged local resettlement agencies to agree to resettle only refugees joining family in the city of Clarkston and find other resettlement sites throughout the state in 2013 for refugees not joining family members. PRM decreased the number of refugees it plans to resettle in Georgia in 2013 by 20%.

The coalition that fought to release the funds consistently monitors legislation that may affect refugees and continues to try to influence the governor, but limited resources make these efforts a challenge. The coalition has worked to coordinate and increase community outreach efforts, but it is receiving feedback from the state that it must do more. There is concern that the lack of clear guidelines for the expected levels of community outreach leaves agencies at a loss for direction and support, leaving them unclear about what more they should be doing when they already have few resources available for their current efforts.

Recent Government Reports Highlight Community Stress Points

In 2010, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the ranking Republican member on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, issued a committee report assessing the government's policies and programs for refugee admission and resettlement. Senator Lugar's interest in the issue stemmed from concerns expressed by the mayor of Fort Wayne, IN, which had received large numbers of Burmese refugees and which in 2008 requested to stop receiving any additional refugees who did not have family already living in the city.⁵⁷

While acknowledging that the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program "is one of the United States' most noble humanitarian traditions," the report raised concerns that the program is underfunded and fails to meet the needs of refugees, particularly in the difficult economic climate. The report highlighted several challenges local resettlement communities face, including lack of full collaboration among community members, stakeholders, and resettlement authorities, and the program's one-size-fits-all approach that fails to take into account important health and socioeconomic factors specific to certain refugee groups. The report expressed concern that federal funding is not sufficient to help refugees after their initial reception period and fails to support the secondary migration of refugees in communities to which they were not originally resettled.⁵⁸ Senator Lugar directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study and report to the Committee on the factors resettlement agencies consider when determining where refugees are assigned, the effects refugees have on their communities, how federal agencies ensure the program's integrity and effectiveness, and what is known about the integration of refugees.



Resettled refugees in Buffalo, NY

The GAO published *Refugee Resettlement: Greater Consultation with Community Stakeholders Could Strengthen Program* in July 2012. It found that state and local stakeholders feel that while refugees bring cultural diversity and stimulate economic growth, they also stretch local resources, particularly safety net programs, which fill the gaps left by insufficient federal support. The GAO also found that frustration among stakeholders resulted from a lack of communication and opportunities for collaboration among refugee service agencies, elected officials, public schools, and health departments regarding their capacity to serve refugees.⁵⁹

The report also makes reference to the issue of refugee integration, noting that the federal government evaluates programs based on early employment and self-sufficiency but not long-term integration.⁶⁰ The U.S. is the only major resettlement country in the world that does not have federal integration benchmarks. In contrast, New Zealand, for example, has a federally designed and implemented resettlement strategy that includes clear outcomes, goals, and success indicators with measurable targets, many of them

long term.⁶¹ In the U.S., professional advancement, social bonding, civic engagement, education, and health are not measured, and refugees and receiving communities have had no opportunity to help define what successful integration means for them.⁶²

Conclusion

Communities across the country are concerned about the cost of providing services for refugees that are not reimbursed by the federal government. These concerns are exacerbated by fear of newcomers who are culturally and religiously different and the economic uncertainty felt by the established local population.

PRM and ORR are clearly worried about the growing resistance to resettlement in communities across the country. PRM has publicly expressed a desire to do what it can to address the backlash. As communities have reached crisis points—as in Tennessee, New Hampshire, and Georgia—PRM has traveled across the country to diffuse tension and defend the resettlement program.

PRM has been amenable to reducing admissions in locations that request fewer refugees, but this sets a dangerous precedent. Accommodation implies a tacit admission that some communities are no longer able to absorb refugees. In addition, should anti-refugee sentiment spread across the country, it could become difficult for PRM to continue to agree to reductions without threatening the viability of the resettlement program.

ORR is also interested in doing more to proactively engage host communities in resettlement. ORR has recently provided a grant to Welcoming America for a “Fostering Community Engagement and Welcoming Communities Project” to “provide technical assistance to the refugee resettlement network, offer new tools and support to create a robust community of practice across refugee agencies, mainstream providers and geographic communities; enhance and sustain resettlement work in local communities; build new partnerships; promote a positive community climate; and ensure the successful integration of refugees in cities and towns across the United States.”⁶³ The nature of the grant indicates that ORR recognizes that more must be done to ensure that communities remain welcoming to refugees.

While the experiences of just three states were reviewed in this paper, refugees are resettled in hundreds of cities, and many communities have experienced some level of backlash. At the same time, it is important to note that some communities, particularly although not exclusively larger cities with large immigrant populations, have not faced major opposition to resettlement in recent years. It would be worthwhile to study these

Consultation and collaboration across sectors—including service providers, elected officials, and the public—are critical to keeping communities open to refugees.

communities to provide a landscape of areas where resettlement backlash is minimal or has been successfully addressed and evaluate effective approaches to creating and sustaining support for resettlement.

There is broad agreement that consultation and collaboration across sectors—including service providers, elected officials, and the public—are critical to keeping communities open to refugees. Improved

information sharing is also important. The national resettlement agencies need more information to better inform refugee placement decisions, and the local agencies need good resources to help them engage relevant stakeholders in the community effectively. Refugees also need more information and orientation prior to their arrival in the U.S. to ensure a smoother transition when they are resettled.

New tools are needed to fight back against a determined legislator or governor who has decided to challenge resettlement for political or other reasons. This is particularly true in communities experiencing economic distress and where there is an anti-immigrant atmosphere. Refugee advocates, service providers, and other supporters of resettlement need new arguments—beyond the humanitarian impact of resettlement—to combat opposition that often couches criticism of resettlement as concern for refugees. Communities hearing leaders talk about “needing a break” or expressing concern that refugees deserve better living conditions or employment opportunities need to hear strong, effective arguments about why resettlement is important for the country and their community.

Identifying new messengers and partners who can advocate for resettlement in their communities is also important. Refugee advocates must reconnect and partner with immigration allies who have had significant experience fighting the anti-immigrant backlash that has been part of the national landscape for years.

Clear, federal-level integration goals and indicators for measuring integration beyond short-term employment are also critical. Without them, it is difficult to argue effectively that the resettlement program is a success.

Finally, advocates for the U.S. refugee program must continue to fight for legislation that improves resettlement and sufficient federal funding to aid refugee victims of persecution who have been given the chance to

start their lives in safety and freedom in the United States, and support the communities across the country that welcome them.

Recommendations

Adopting the following recommendations would help counter the refugee backlash and keep communities open and welcoming to refugee resettlement:

- 1. The refugee resettlement agencies should build and support capacity at the national and local levels to generate and maintain broad-based commitment to resettlement in local communities.**
 - **Get Organized:** The national resettlement agencies should launch a funded, proactive organizing initiative, coordinated nationally but strongly rooted in local action, to raise awareness in communities about the benefits of resettlement and proactively prevent resettlement backlash.
 - **Develop a Rapid Response Plan:** The national resettlement agencies, with the help of local affiliates that have experience responding to anti-resettlement sentiment and action in their communities, should create a plan for quickly responding to emerging anti-resettlement activity and supporting local efforts to organize and fight anti-resettlement measures in their communities. The agencies should identify three to five pilot locations facing or at risk of facing rising anti-refugee sentiment, where local resettlement agencies can work across volag networks to build diverse stakeholder teams of resettled refugees, service providers, and community, business, and faith leaders and train them to become effective spokespeople for refugee resettlement in their communities.
 - **Create New Messages:** The national resettlement agencies should coordinate the work of developing new messages to respond to anti-refugee sentiment and proactively promote resettlement. National and local target audiences for the new messages include elected officials and other decision makers as well as the broader community. Messages highlighting the humanitarian goals of resettlement and historical role of the U.S. in protecting refugees are no longer sufficient: They must now also highlight refugees' positive impact on local communities and the country.
 - **Partner with Immigrant Advocates:** National and local resettlement agencies should strengthen ties between refugee and immigration advocates to provide mutual support and ensure collaboration on advocacy relating to areas of mutual concern. The national resettlement agencies should initiate discussion with national immigration groups, state immigrant and refugee coalitions, and other potential allies to discuss the rise in anti-refugee sentiment in communities across the country and the challenges faced by the resettlement program and refugees, and to begin or renew partnerships. With the help and support of the national refugee organizations, local refugee groups should also initiate dialogues with immigrant advocates in their communities in order to create or renew connections and identify areas of possible collaboration.
 - **Track Anti-Resettlement Legislation:** The national refugee agencies should partner with the National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) to ensure that anti-refugee legislation is identified early and tracked systematically so the resettlement agencies can quickly respond.
 - **Conduct Research on Local Anti-Refugee Leaders:** The national refugee agencies should partner with groups such as Center for New Community and Southern Poverty Law Center to learn more

about individuals and groups leading local efforts to resist resettlement, to determine if they belong to organized anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim organizations or networks.

2. The federal government should create national benchmarks for refugee integration and measure progress toward success.

- **Create Goals for Successful Refugee Integration:** The federal government should clearly articulate the integration goals of the U.S. refugee resettlement program. PRM and ORR should begin to define these goals in a collaborative manner by considering the perspectives of all parties in the process, including state and local and public and private partners, as well as refugees and receiving communities. The goals for the U.S. refugee resettlement program should include successful integration from the perspective of both the refugee and the receiving communities.
- **Identify and Measure Key Indicators of Success:** The federal government should work with stakeholders in the resettlement program to identify indicators of integration that include factors beyond short-term employment, among them long-term employment, civic participation, health and well-being, and English proficiency. Benchmarks should be established for these indicators, progress toward success should be measured, and data should be collected. A group of organizations including UNHCR, the University of Texas School of Social Work, and others have written a proposal that would launch such a project. Studies should be conducted on an ongoing basis to identify the factors that impede or advance progress toward integration goals.

3. PRM and ORR should develop and share best practices for community consultation.

While the cooperative agreement requires community consultation, which occurs to some extent in all resettlement communities, PRM and ORR should work with the resettlement agencies and groups such as Welcoming America to identify best practices to guide a robust and productive consultation process and provide training to ensure that all resettlement agencies benefit from the effective practices and experiences of other communities.

4. PRM and ORR should improve information sharing during the resettlement process.

PRM should provide ORR and the refugee-receiving communities with all available information that UNHCR and the Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) already collect about refugees processed for resettlement to the U.S., including information obtained during screening interviews and the content of refugee applications. The information should be disclosed to the national and local resettlement agencies as early in the process as possible, in order to better inform placement decisions and to plan for resettlement services, particularly in “preferred community” programs that ORR funds to assist refugees with special needs. This information is especially important for challenging or unusual cases, such as refugees with severe medical problems, survivors of torture, or sexual minority (LGBTI) refugees to help them become better integrated and more productive in their new communities.

5. PRM should better prepare refugees for resettlement before they arrive in the U.S.

Refugees often wait for months after they are approved for resettlement before they are able to travel to the U.S. Without prolonging the wait, PRM should use the time to better prepare refugees for life in the United States. PRM should supplement existing one- to five-day cultural orientation courses with English lessons, stress management sessions, and other programming depending on the needs of the refugee. Successful PRM-funded English language classes that have been piloted in Kenya, Thailand, and Nepal and HIAS’ privately funded “Continuum of Care” stress management program for Darfuris in the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya should serve as models for these programs.

6. **The national and local refugee resettlement agencies, along with partners, stakeholders, and supporters of refugee resettlement, should advocate for federal refugee reform and sufficient funding for refugee resettlement.**
- Advocate for federal funding: Partners and stakeholders in refugee resettlement must continue to advocate for strong federal support of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.
 - Change the system for funding resettlement agencies: PRM should change its system for funding local resettlement agencies for the reception and placement (R&P) of refugees. PRM's contribution to the administrative costs of the refugee agencies should be based on the arrivals that PRM anticipates in a given year as reflected in the resettlement plans for each resettlement site. Ensuring that administrative cost reimbursements are forward looking and based on planned refugee admissions rather than backward looking and based on actual arrivals allows the agencies to plan for new refugees and to maintain the local staff and expertise necessary to resettle refugees effectively.
 - Enact reforms to modernize the U.S. refugee admissions program: Congress should enact legislative reforms to the refugee resettlement program including long-term case management for vulnerable populations, assistance for secondary migrants, integration services, recertification for highly skilled refugees, changing ORR's formula for state funding for refugee services, and other changes included in the *Strengthening Refugee Resettlement Act*, *Domestic Refugee Resettlement and Modernization Act*, and *Refugee Protection Act*.

Appendix A: UNHCR Resettlement Statistics by Resettlement Country, FY 2011 Admissions

RESETTLEMENT COUNTRY	TOTAL	PERCENT OF TOTAL RESETTLED
United States*	43,215	70.10%
Canada	6,827	11.07%
Australia	5,597	9.08%
Sweden	1,896	3.08%
Norway	1,258	2.04%
Denmark	606	0.98%
Finland	573	0.93%
Netherlands	479	0.78%
New Zealand	477	0.77%
United Kingdom	424	0.69%
France	42	0.07%
Switzerland	39	0.06%
Ireland	36	0.06%
Portugal	28	0.05%
Argentina	24	0.04%
Brazil	23	0.04%
Chile	22	0.04%
Germany	22	0.04%
Belgium	19	0.03%
Japan	18	0.03%
Paraguay	13	0.02%
Republic of Korea	11	0.02%
GRAND TOTAL	61,649	100.00%

**Includes departures to the U.S. of individuals referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program by UNHCR.
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2013, Report to Congress, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/198157.pdf>*

Appendix B: Per Capita Resettlement by Country of Resettlement, FY 2010


COUNTRY OF RESETTLEMENT	2010 (PERSONS)	NATIONAL POPULATION*	RESETTLED REFUGEES PER CAPITA
Australia	5,636	21,512,000	3,817
Norway	1,088	4,855,000	4,462
Canada	6,706	33,890,000	5,054
Sweden	1,789	9,293,000	5,195
United States	54,077	317,641,000	5,874
New Zealand	535	4,303,000	8,043
Finland	543	5,346,000	9,845
Denmark	386	5,481,000	14,199
Netherlands	430	16,653,000	38,728
Iceland	6	329,000	54,833
United Kingdom	695	61,899,000	89,063
Uruguay	17	3,372,000	198,353
Czech Republic	48	10,411,000	216,896
Ireland	20	4,589,000	229,450
France	217	62,637,000	288,650
Portugal	24	10,732,000	447,167
Paraguay	13	6,460,000	496,923
Romania	38	21,190,000	557,632
Chile	6	17,135,000	2,855,833
Japan (pilot program)	27	126,995,000	4,703,519
Brazil	28	195,423,000	6,979,393
COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS/AD-HOC RESETTLEMENT INTAKE			
Germany	457	82,057,000	179,556
Switzerland	19	7,595,000	399,737
Italy	58	60,098,000	1,036,172
Argentina	23	40,666,000	1,768,087
Republic of Korea	23	48,501,000	2,108,739
Belgium	2	10,698,000	5,349,000
GRAND TOTAL	72,911	1,189,761,000	16,318

* National population: United Nations, Population Division,
"World Population Prospects: The 2007 Revision," New York, 2008

UNHCR

[http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4fbd04af9&query="resettlement countries" per capita](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4fbd04af9&query=)

Appendix C: Refugee Admissions to the United States, FY 1990 to 2011



Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).

Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2011.pdf

Appendix D: Refugee Arrivals to the United States, FY 1980 to 2011

YEAR	NUMBER
1980	207,116
1981	159,252
1982	98,096
1983	61,218
1984	70,393
1985	67,704
1986	62,146
1987	64,528
1988	76,483
1989	107,070
1990	122,066
1991	113,389
1992	115,548
1993	114,181
1994	111,680
1995	98,973
1996	75,421
1997	69,653
1998	76,712
1999	85,285
2000	72,143
2001	68,925
2002	26,788
2003	28,286
2004	52,840
2005	53,738
2006	41,094
2007	48,218
2008	60,107
2009	74,602
2010	73,293
2011	56,384

Note: Data series began following the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. Excludes Amerasian immigrants except in Fiscal Years 1989 to 1991.

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS), Fiscal Years 1980 to 2011.

Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb_2011.pdf

Appendix E: Refugee Arrivals by Age, FY 2003 to 2011

AGE	2011		2010		2009		2008	
	TOTAL	PERCENT	TOTAL	PERCENT	TOTAL	PERCENT	TOTAL	PERCENT
0-17 years	19,232	34.1%	25,373	34.6%	25,185	33.8%	21,637	36%
18-24 years	9,588	17%	11,853	16.2%	11,747	15.7%	9,429	15.7%
25-34 years	11,802	20.9%	14,954	20.4%	14,842	19.9%	10,906	18.1%
35-44 years	7,124	12.6%	9,587	13.1%	10,082	13.5%	8,058	13.4%
45-54 years	4,230	7.5%	5,727	7.8%	5,971	8%	5,000	8.3%
55-64 years	2,438	4.3%	3,218	4.4%	3,649	4.9%	2,812	4.7%
65+ years	1,970	3.5%	2,581	3.5%	3,126	4.2%	2,266	3.8%
GRAND TOTAL	56,384	100%	73,293	100%	74,602	100%	60,108	100%

AGE	2007		2006		2005		2004		2003	
	TOTAL	PERCENT	TOTAL	PERCENT	TOTAL	PERCENT	TOTAL	PERCENT	TOTAL	PERCENT
0-17 years	18,202	37.7%	15,431	37.5%	20,219	37.6%	19,742	37.3%	8,108	28.5%
18-24 years	9,088	18.8%	8,056	19.6%	9,636	17.9%	10,026	19%	5,563	19.6%
25-34 years	8,058	16.7%	6,365	15.5%	8,422	15.7%	8,582	16.2%	4,748	16.7%
35-44 years	5,586	11.6%	4,942	12%	6,797	12.6%	6,000	11.3%	3,698	13%
45-54 years	3,552	7.4%	3,059	7.4%	40,049	7.5%	3,642	6.9%	2,654	9.3%
55-64 years	2,192	4.5%	1,782	4.3%	2,364	4.4%	2,446	4.6%	1,675	5.9%
65+ years	1,540	3.2%	1,515	3.7%	2,326	4.3%	2,430	4.6%	1,976	7%
GRAND TOTAL	48,218	100%	41,150	100%	53,813	100%	52,868	100%	28,422	100%

Office of Immigration Statistics
<http://www.dhs.gov/office-immigration-statistics>

Appendix F: Refugee Arrivals by Country of Nationality, FY 2009 to 2011

COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY	2011		2010		2009	
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
Burma	16,972	30.1%	16,693	22.8%	18,202	24.4%
Bhutan	14,999	26.6%	12,363	16.9%	13,452	18.0%
Iraq	9,388	16.7%	18,016	24.6%	18,838	25.3%
Somalia	3,161	5.6%	4,884	6.7%	4,189	5.6%
Cuba	2,920	5.2%	4,818	6.6%	4,800	6.4%
Eritrea	2,032	3.6%	2,570	3.5%	1,571	2.1%
Iran	2,032	3.6%	3,543	4.8%	5,381	7.2%
DR Congo	977	1.7%	3,174	4.3%	1,135	1.5%
Ethiopia	560	1.0%	668	0.9%	321	0.4%
Afghanistan	428	0.8%	515	0.7%	349	0.5%
All other countries, including unknown	2,915	5.2%	6,049	8.3%	6,364	8.5%
TOTAL	56,384	100.0%	73,293	100.0%	74,602	100.0%

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).

Refugee Arrivals by Country of Nationality, FY 2006 to 2008

COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY	2008		2007		2006	
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
Burma	18,139	30.2%	13,896	28.8%	1,612	3.9%
Iraq	13,823	23.0%	1,608	3.3%	202	0.5%
Bhutan	5,320	8.9%	—	—	3	—
Iran	5,270	8.8%	5,481	11.4%	2,792	6.8%
Cuba	4,177	6.9%	2,922	6.1%	3,143	7.6%
Burundi	2,889	4.8%	4,545	9.4%	466	1.1%
Somalia	2,523	4.2%	6,969	14.5%	10,357	25.2%
Vietnam	1,112	1.9%	1,500	3.1%	3,039	7.4%
Ukraine	1,022	1.7%	1,605	3.3%	2,483	6.0%
Liberia	992	1.7%	1,606	3.3%	2,402	5.8%
Other	4,841	8.1%	8,086	16.8%	14,651	35.6%
TOTAL	60,108	100.0%	48,218	100.0%	41,150	100.0%

— Represents zero or rounds to zero

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).

Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2011.pdf

http://www.refugeefamilyservices.org/images/uploads/Refugee_and_Asylees_2008_Annual_Flow_Report.pdf

Appendix G: Refugee Arrivals in Tennessee by Country of Origin, FY 2006 to 2011

COUNTRY	2011	2010	2009	2008		
Afghanistan	8	0	0	8	19	0
Antigua	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bangladesh	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bhutan	278	210	329	63	0	0
Burma	369	393	356	185	158	11
Burundi	13	16	45	105	308	8
Chad	1	0	0	0	0	0
China	0	1	0	1	0	0
Colombia	4	12	0	2	3	0
Congo	0	0	4	0	7	1
Costa Rica	0	1	0	0	0	0
Cuba	75	73	39	41	30	60
DR Congo	5	38	17	9	10	0
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	1
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	1	0
Eritrea	31	56	30	0	1	9
Ethiopia	17	13	3	5	17	31
FSU	9	6	14	18	24	72
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	3
India	1	0	1	0	0	0
Iran	22	20	36	35	61	45
Iraq	212	538	378	174	19	2
Israel	1	5	0	0	0	0
Jordan	0	3	1	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	1
Korea, North	2	4	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	0	1	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	1	1	1	2	0	0
Liberia	1	2	0	7	23	39
Malaysia	0	0	0	1	2	0
Nepal	5	1	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	2
Pakistan	4	5	2	20	0	0
Philippines	0	1	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	1	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	1	5	1	0	11	0
Sierra Leone	1	0	0	0	0	3
Somalia	162	173	205	74	172	313
South Africa	0	1	0	0	0	0
Sudan	12	15	16	20	26	99
Syria	1	0	1	1	0	0
Thailand	0	1	0	48	57	2
The Gambia	0	1	0	0	0	0
Togo	0	0	0	9	0	0
Turkey	0	0	1	0	0	0
Vietnam	0	7	2	18	11	19
Yemen	0	0	1	0	1	1
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	1	0	1
GRAND TOTAL	1,236	1,605	1,492	847	961	724

Office of Refugee Resettlement

<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/refugee-arrival-data>

Appendix H: Refugee Arrivals in New Hampshire by Country of Origin, FY 2006 to 2011

COUNTRY	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Afghanistan	0	1	0	3	0	0
Bhutan	432	380	452	272	0	0
Burkina Faso	0	1	0	0	0	0
Burma	9	2	17	0	0	0
Burundi	1	7	5	51	115	10
Cameroon	0	4	0	0	0	6
DR Congo	10	38	6	24	23	3
Egypt	0	0	0	1	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	1
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	1	3
Ethiopia	0	0	2	0	3	5
FSU	0	2	1	2	33	105
Iran	0	1	0	0	1	4
Iraq	42	95	49	100	0	0
Ivory Coast	0	0	0	0	2	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	2
Lebanon	1	0	0	0	0	0
Liberia	0	0	7	0	0	17
Malaysia	8	3	0	0	0	0
Nepal	3	5	1	3	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	8	1	0
Rwanda	0	0	0	0	4	0
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	2	1	11
Somalia	6	5	1	43	60	59
Sudan	5	0	10	5	6	32
Thailand	0	2	0	0	0	0
Togo	0	0	0	6	0	0
Vietnam	0	0	8	1	0	10
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	3
GRAND TOTAL	517	546	559	521	250	271

Office of Refugee Resettlement

<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/refugee-arrival-data>

Appendix I: Refugee Arrivals in Georgia by Country of Origin, FY 2006 to 2011

COUNTRY	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Afghanistan	29	63	18	23	16	44
Angola	0	0	1	0	4	0
Bhutan	1,012	713	992	549	0	0
Burma	913	946	875	574	401	23
Burundi	0	19	25	116	222	74
Cambodia	0	0	0	0	1	1
Central African Republic	31	11	10	0	0	0
Chad	2	1	0	7	1	0
China	4	0	5	3	0	0
Colombia	8	19	18	8	13	3
Congo	0	6	18	7	2	3
Costa Rica	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cuba	42	96	116	40	36	32
DR Congo	19	157	66	11	25	10
Egypt	0	0	1	1	0	0
Eritrea	110	187	104	17	82	28
Ethiopia	49	81	37	8	44	64
FSU	22	18	19	36	106	445
Guinea	0	0	0	0	1	0
India	0	0	1	0	0	0
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	4
Iran	44	68	90	51	75	49
Iraq	151	397	400	423	19	16
Israel	7	69	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	0	0	0	1	0	0
Jordan	0	4	0	0	0	0
Kenya	1	0	0	0	1	4
Korea, North	1	1	1	1	1	0
Kuwait	0	0	0	0	7	0
Laos	7	0	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	0	5	2	0	1	0
Liberia	2	17	22	18	55	51
Malaysia	5	4	0	1	9	0
Mauritania	0	0	2	0	7	11
Nepal	2	2	1	9	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	22	10	7
Pakistan	0	11	9	11	8	0
Panama	0	1	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	1	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	0	16	2	9	9	1
Saudi Arabia	0	1	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	3
Sierra Leone	1	0	3	0	1	15
Somalia	149	217	272	110	205	358
Sri Lanka	13	24	3	0	0	0
Sudan	10	41	75	6	27	70
Syria	0	2	2	1	0	0
Tanzania	0	1	0	0	0	0
Thailand	0	0	0	214	136	6
The Gambia	0	0	3	0	0	0
Togo	0	0	0	9	1	1
Tunisia	1	1	0	0	0	0
Uganda	0	2	2	0	0	0
Vietnam	0	15	58	39	90	119
West Bank	0	6	3	0	0	0
Zambia	0	1	1	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	14	0	1	0
(GHANDI TOTAL)	2,635	3,224	3,272	2,325	1,617	1,442

Office of Refugee Resettlement

<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/refugee-arrival-data>

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